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Securities Regulation in Germany?
Investors' Remedies for Misleading
Statements by Issuerst
I. Introduction
Few international legal scholars would argue with the statement that the
legal system of the United States has produced a unique and detailed
framework governing the issuance and trading of securities.' Compared to
this highly complex legislation, other industrialized nations lack any signifi-
cant securities regulations. Among the countries of the European continent,
Belgium is regarded as having developed the most comprehensive scheme
of securities regulation by promulgating the "Act Controlling the Issuance
of Securities" as early as 1935.2 More recently, France has enacted similar
provisions.3
The Federal Republic of Germany, 4 however, has not followed these
examples. Although the Stock Corporation Reform Act of 1965 has been
commended for its advanced approach to regulating corporate structures, 5
the legislation has failed to develop uniform provisions to protect investors'
*Erstes Juristisches Staatsexamen, Freiburg, 1978; Zweites Juristisches Staatsexamen
Mainz, 1981; M.C.J., University of Texas, 1982; attorney, admitted in Germany, Smith,
Cohen, Ringel, Kohler & Martin, Atlanta, Georgia. The author wishes to acknowledge the
kind assistance of Mr. Paul C. Ford and Laurence Shuman-Eckbold in the preparation of this
article.
tAll abbreviations in citations of German legal periodicals and other German sources are
quoted pursuant to the index of abbreviations of the Neue Juristische Wochenschrift.
'See Hopt, Gutachten zum 51. Deutschen Juristentag G85.
'ArrtC royal n. 185 du 9 Juillet 1935 sur le contr6le des banques et le r6gime des dmissions
de titres et valeurs (Moniteur belge du 10 Juillet 1935). Further legislative steps were taken in
1964, 1969 and 1975. For detailed comment see Hopt, Vom Aktien-und Boersenrecht zum
Kapitalmarktrecht-Teil 1- Der international erreichte Stand des Kapitalmarktrechtes, 140
ZHR 215-27 (1976).
3Hopt, supra note 2, at 227-38.
4Hereinafter referred to as Germany.
'See Hopt, supra note 2, at 202.
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rights in the capital market. Hence, the present state of Germany's securi-
ties market has been compared to the situation in the United States prior to
the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933.6 While such comparisons may
be hyperbolic, it is certainly true that wide sectors of the German capital
market are not subject to any legislative or regulatory control.7 Unlike the
U.S. Securities Act of 1933, German law has not adopted a general defini-
tion of "a security" which is to be protected by uniformly applicable stat-
utes. Consequently, only certain types of securities are subject to statutory
regulation, 8 whereas other investments may be conducted completely
outside any regulatory scheme.9 To understand German securities regula-
tions, a distinction, unknown in the United States, must be drawn between
"qualified" and "free" capital markets.
II. Statutory Background
A. Stock Corporations
The oldest and most established piece of legislation governing the Ger-
man capital market is the Boersengesetz of 1908 (BoersG), the German
Securities Exchange Act, '0 controlling the issuance and trading of shares of
stock which are registered with a National Securities Exchange. The
BoersG was designed to regulate the National Stock Exchanges"I and the
conduct of trade thereon,' 2 as well as to control the admittance of issues to
regular' 3 and futures trading.' 4 Among the requirements to be met in
applying admittance to an exchange, the BoersG mandates that certain dis-
closures be made by an issuer in order to ensure "that the public be
informed, to the extent possible, about all factual and legal aspects neces-
sary . . . ,,'5 to the decision to purchase and to "prohibit issues signifi-
cantly impairing public interest or causing obvious detriment to the
'See Hopt, Vom Aktien-und Boersenrecht zum Kapitalmarkirecht-Teil 2: Die deutsche
Eniwicklung im internationalen Vergleich, 141 ZHR 397 (1977).
'Thus, under German Law insider trading is not prohibited, apart from actual fraud or
breach of contract. Efforts are in progress to reach a common understanding among the major
corporations to ban insider trading by means of uniform contracts prohibiting certain persons
from using inside information. However, even these private attempts seem to be far from
being successful. In reference to this problem, see SAMM, BOERSENRECHT, 137-54 (1978). For
a brief comment on a recent major insider case that has remained without sanction, see
INSIDER - FALL OHNE FOLGEN? DAS WERTPAPIER, 305 (1982).
'See infra part 11.
'See infra part 111.
"Promulgated on May 27, 1908 (RGBI. p. 215). This act revised the previous Exchange Act
of 1896.
"See BoersG §§ 1-28.
2See BoersG §§ 29-35.
"See BoersG §§ 36-49.
'See BoersG §§ 50-70.
"See BoergG § 36(3)(b).
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public."' 6 To this end, the act requires the filing of a prospectus which
must be published at least three days17 prior to the admittance of the issue
for trade on the exchange.' 8
Correspondingly, sections 45 and 46 BoersG impose a so-called "pro-
spectus liability" on issuers for the benefit of investors who have relied on
false or misleading information stated in the prospectus. 19 Though the dis-
closures required by these statutes are limited to statements made in con-
nection with the initial issue of the shares, relief is also provided for
damages incurred by virtue of purchases effected in the secondary market.
20
Additionally, section 88 BoersG imposes criminal sanctions on persons who
make misleading statements in a prospectus with intent to defraud. How-
ever, any recovery of damages is limited by section 47 BoersG to a period of
five years after the initial issue.
At first glance, this statute seems to offer ample remedy for the defrauded
investor; however, the intended impact of prospectus liability is signifi-
cantly limited for two reasons. First, section 45 BoersG requires that the
prospectus be published before the purchase of the security is effectuated.
Although the security itself may be issued only after the publication of the
prospectus, 21 it has become a standard practice among German banks22 to
'"See BoersG §36(3)(c).
"See BoersG § 38, § 17 of the Exchange Regulations, infra note 18. It must be emphasized,
however, that this provision does not require that the individual investor be furnished a pro-
spectus. See also SCHWARK, KOMMENTAR ZUM BOERSENGESETZ, § 38 (1976).
"See BoersG § 36(3), 38, as well as the corresponding Exchange Regulations §§ 5-8 in
BEKANNTMACHUNG BETREFFEND DIE ZULASSUNG VON WERTPAPIEREN ZUM BOERSEN-
HANDEL vom 4. Juli 1910 (RGBI. p. 917).
'
9 BoersG § 45(1) reads:
If a prospectus in connection with which securities have been admitted to a stock exchange
states untrue facts essential to the determination of the value of these securities, the issuers
of such prospectus, as well as persons initiating the issuance of such prospectus, shall be
jointly liable, provided that said persons had knowledge of the misstatement or due to gross
negligence did not have knowledge of the misstatement, to each bearer of the security for
damage resulting from the difference between the actual circumstances and the circum-
stances stated in such prospectus. The same shall result if a prospectus is incomplete due to
the omittance of relevant facts and if this incompleteness was caused by wrongful conceal-
ment or wrongful failure of sufficient examination on part of persons having issued or hav-
ing initiated the issue of such prospectus.
BoersG § 46(1) reads:
Liability shall be imposed only with respect to securities which were admitted [to a National
Stock Exchange] on the basis of such prospectus and which were acquired by the bearer by
virtue of a transaction conducted domestically.
By virture of BoersG section 46(2), liability can be limited to the repurchase of the shares for
the amount spent by the investor. Section 46(3) excludes such persons from any recovery who
had or should have had knowledge of the misstatement.
2 See Hopt, supra note 6 at 396.
"See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
"In this context, it should be noticed that Germany, unlike the United States, has developed
a universal banking system. Under German Law, banks are not limited to commercial and/or
investment banking as in the American system, but are also engaged in securities business
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offer future rights in the security to be issued, prior to the publication of the
prospectus.23 Transactions involving these not-yet-issued "securities" are
not covered by any prospectus liability provisions. 24 Still, actions brought
under section 45 BoersG have been fairly rare occurrences, 25 probably due
to the fact that registration statements may only be filed by banks.26 That
is, a limited number of banks are engaged in the business of underwriting
issues to be traded at a National Stock Exchange and these banks have
usually proceeded with utmost caution in this area in order not to jeopard-
ize their professional reputations.
27
Secondly, investors' remedies are hampered by the strict limitation of
applicability of section 45 BoersG to issues traded on a National Stock
Exchange. As only the stock of very large corporations is traded on a
National Stock Exchange, the majority of issues fall outside BoersG protec-
tion.28 Moreover, the stringent rules applicable solely to securities traded
on a National Stock Exchange may have the effect of causing disreputable
issuers to avoid registering their securities with a National Exchange and
opt instead for distribution on the unregulated market.
Shares of stock not traded on an exchange are subject only to the
Aktiengesetz (AktG), the German Stock Corporation Act. 29 The
Aktiengesetz was not designed to cover securities, but instead outlines the
responsibilities of officers and directors of corporations and establishes the
rights of shareholders, including the right to receive periodic disclosures.
30
which would be performed by a broker or dealer in the United States. See Gesetz ueber das
Kreditwesen (KWG) § 1(l)(4), (5), (6), 3. Mai 1976 (BGBI. I. p. 1121), where the securities
business is explicitly mentioned as being one of the activities to be conducted by banks.
"See Canaris, Bankrecht note 2058, 2241 (1981); see also Hopt supra note 6 at 396. For a
specific comment on debentures in that matter, see Horn, Die Rechtsgrundlagen des Handels
'oer Erscheinen" in Pfandbriefen, 1976 WM 862.
2 This practice has been approved very recently by the German Supreme Court; see BGH in
NJW 82, at 2827, where the court denied relief to an investor who bought shares of stock
before the defective prospectus had been published.
"The "Beton und Monierbau" decision, rendered by the German Supreme Court on July
12, 1982 (BGH in NJW 1982, at 2823), attracted extensive public attention. In this case, a
bank had invited prospective investors to acquire newly issued shares representing a net worth
of DM 62.5 million. Less than six months later, the issuer had to seek protection under the
German Bankruptcy Act. The court found that the prospectus in question had omitted mate-
rial facts and granted relief to the shareholders who acquired shares after the publication of
the prospectus. See also BGH, supra note 24.
2 See § 5(1) of the Exchange Regulations, supra note 18.
" Hopt, supra note 1, at G 112.
"As of Dec. 31, 1980, 2,141 stock corporations were registered in Germany; see EICK, So
NUTZT MAN DEN WIRTSCHAFTSTEIL EINER TAGESZEITUNG, 281 (1982). In the same year only
224 domestic stock corporations were listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the country's
largest stock exchange; see JAHRESBERICHTE DER FRANKFURTER WERTPAPIERBOERSE, 63
(1982). See infra note 129.
"Aktiengesetz, vom 6. September 1965 (BGBI. 1. p. 1089).
"Iln that respect the Aktiengesetz imposes thorough disclosure requirements to insure the
shareholder's protection. See Schwark, Kapitalanlegerschutz im deutschen Gesellschaftsrechi, 3
ZGR 271, 295 (1976).
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It offers only very limited protection to an investor during the period of
initial issuance of equity securities and in no way attempts to regulate the
secondary securities exchange market.
Provisions governing the structure of a corporation and the initial issue of
shares may be divided into two categories. One set of provisions sets forth
guidelines for the issuance of the stock, i.e., rules for capitalization and the
prohibition against issuing shares for less than par value.31 No distinction
is made between a private and a public offering in those respects. A second
set of provisions covers information to be disclosed during and prior to the
issuance of stock. Among these, section 47(3) of the AktG 32 imposes a pen-
alty for providing misleading information in a public advertisement of an
offering. This section is probably the most important provision securing
investors' rights during the initial issue. However, the safeguard of AktG
section 47(3) is limited for several reasons.33 First, it is unclear whether
AktG section 47(3) can be applied to any new issue of an existing company
or whether it is limited to the comparably rare occurrence of an initial first
issue. No definitive decision has been rendered on this issue as of this writ-
ing. Second, since bonds are excluded by the provision, it is uncertain
whether the section can be applied to misleading statements published in
connection with convertible debentures. Finally, the Stock Corporation Act
does not cover foreign companies, therefore, advertisements made by for-
eign companies are never subject to the AktG section 47(3) sanctions.
B. Domestic Investment Companies
Unlike the rather limited protection provided for investors in the trading
of stock, more sophisticated provisions govern the distribution of invest-
ment shares. The need to administer that activity arose in response to a
growth in the number of joint investment operations amidst the economic
upturn of the post-war period and resulted in the introduction of the Invest-
ment Company Act, Gesetz ueber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften of 1957,
(KAGG).34 The KAGG, which governs the distribution of domestic
3 See generally Hopt, supra note 6, at 391.
3 2Pursuant to AktG § 47(3) such person is liable:
[w]ho, either prior to the registration of the corporation in the Commercial Register or
within two years thereafter, announces the public sale of shares of stock in order to effectu-
ate their distribution, if he had knowledge or, if in executing due diligence of a prudent
merchant he should have had knowledge, of the incorrectness or incompleteness of state-
ments made in connection with the foundation of the corporation (§ 46(l)), or concerning
the detriment to the corporation by virtue of tangible or intangible capital invested.
33For discussion of the following limitations of AktG § 47(3), see Hopt supra note 6 at 392-
94.
3
"Gesetz ueber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften vom 16. April 1957 (BGBI 1. p. 378), as
amended on January 14, 1970 (BGBI. I. p. 127); for a survey on the history of the act, as well
as of the development of investment companies in general, see von Caemmerer, Kapitalanlage
- oder Investmenigeselischaften, in 1958 JZ 41.
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mutual funds, has been regarded as the first major step toward enacting
securities regulation provisions in Germany. 35
The act requires that four basic conditions be met in the formation of an
investment company. 36 First, the investment company must be a corpora-
tion 37 which is primarily engaged in the business of investing money. Sec-
ond, the company must maintain a joint account in its own name for the
benefit of its investors, which account must be kept separate from the com-
pany's assets.38 Third, the investment must be limited to securities 39 or real
estate40 ; ventures investing in commodities are not considered investment
companies under the act. Finally, the risk of investment has to be diversi-
fied [Risikomischung]4 1; thus, ventures which invest in a single project or
which serve merely as holding companies do not qualify as investment
companies.
A company not meeting these conditions will be deemed not to be an
investment company and will not be governed by the act. Since investment
ventures are not forced to comply with the KAGG, the restrictions set forth
in the act can be easily circumvented by evading one of the conditions nec-
essary to qualify as an investment company. For instance, if a company
decides not to keep the investors' joint account at arms length, as required
by KAGG section I, but chooses instead to intermingle companies' and
investors' assets, it will not be considered an investment company under the
act. 42 By the same token, the investment will not be eligible for the KAGG
protection.
Perhaps the most serious negative consequence of such circumvention
would be increased taxation, as the venture would be deprived of significant
"See Schwark, supra note 30 at 298.
"KAGG § 1(1) defines an investment company as follows:
Investment company (Kapitalanlagegesellschaft) means an enterprise which is primarily
engaged in investing deposit monies for the joint account of the investors, to be kept sepa-
rately from the accounts of tht company, in securities or real estate and building rights in
such a way as to diversify the risks of such investment and by issuing securities
(Anteilsscheine) to the investor (Anteilsinhaber) for the rights resulting therefrom.
"Pursuant to KAGG § 2(l), the investment company has to be either an AG (stock corpora-
tion) or a GmbH; see infra note 84.
"Thus, differing from the approach in § 3(a) of the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940,
investors of a German investment company do not become shareholders. Moreover, KAGG
§ 6(l) requires that deposits may not become equity of the investment company, but shall be
held either by the investment company as trustee or directly by the investors as joint venturers.
in addition, KAGG § 8 enumerates specific types of securities which are eligible solely for
investment purposes. Speculative trading, such as options or short sales, is not mentioned in
this provision and is, therefore, deemed not to be permitted.
"For a comment on real estate investments in that respect, see Steder, Die neue Invest-
mentgesetzgebung, 1969 WM, BEtL 2, at 13-16.
"'See KAGG §§ 8(3), (4), (5) and § 27 for a list of criteria necessary to diversify investment
risk.
"See supra note 38 and accompanying text. See also Hoffmann - Riem, Der Geltungsbe-
reich der Invesumenigesetze, 1972 BB 244-45.
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tax advantages available only to investment companies. 4 3 Moreover, the
company would be barred from using the word "investment" or any similar
designation in its name, 4 and thus, would be clearly identifiable as a poten-
tially hazardous investment. In practice, this combination of tax preference
versus trade restriction discourages most investment funds from operating
"outside" the act.45 Still, highly speculative investment ventures which
choose not to qualify under the KAGG are not totally barred, but they
must bear the burden of heavier taxation.
Accredited investment companies do have to comply with strict disclo-
sure provisions.46 In addition to the required biannual filing of inventory
statements, 4 7 an investment company must furnish each investor a current
prospectus prior to or concurrent with the purchase of the investment secur-
ity.4 8 The prospectus must provide the following: specific information as to
the company's investment policies, terms and time schedule of inventory
statements, the management fee of the company, and the redemption price
of the securities.4 9 In addition, a current inventory statement must be
included in the prospectus50
Section 20, KAGG provides for civil liability if any part of the prospectus
contains an untrue statement of material fact or omits a statement of a
material fact required under the act. 5' Prospectus liability, as defined
under the KAGG, offers a significantly wider scope of protection than the
counterpart provision of the BoersG. Unlike the BoersG remedy,5 2 section
20, KAGG does not limit liability to the issuer and its affiliates, but covers
dealer-investor transactions as well. Relief is also extended in cases where
the investor acquired knowledge of the prospectus' defectiveness only after
"See KAGG §§ 38-50. Section 38(1) grants, in short, a tax-exempt status from income,
trade. and property taxation for securities held by the fund; similar provisions (§ 44) govern
real estate assets. The provisions are designed to avoid double taxation. The individual inves-
tor is, of course, subject to personal taxes with respect to his investment share. For further
information on that issue, see Jung, Die steuerrechtlichen Vorschrifen der neuen Invest-
mentgesetzgebung, 1969 WM, BELL. 2, 19-28.
'See KAGG § 7(l).
"'See also Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 42, at 245.
'See Schwark, supra note 30, at 298, where Schwark commended the standard of disclosure
as excellent.
7See KAGG § 25.
"See KAGG § 19.
"German investment companies may be set up as open-end funds only; it is mandatory for
the company to provide for redemption of the shares. See KAGG § 11(2).
"
0See KAGG, §§ 15(3)(a)-(i), 19, where additional details are enumerated. For comment
see Baur, InvesImentgeselze, KAGG §§ 15 & 19.
-'KAGG § 20(l)(i) reads: "If a prospectus (§ 19) contains untrue or incomplete statements,
material to the evaluation of the investment security, any person who purchased the invest-
ment security in reliance on such prospectus may return the investment security for reimburse-
ment of the purchase price jointly to the investment company and to any person that sold these
securities as a professional dealer."
2See BoersG § 45 and supra note 19, with accompanying text.
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he sold the security. In such a case, the investor is entitled to the difference
between the initial purchase price and the amount received in the subse-
quent transaction. 53 Furthermore, investor-broker transactions are subject
to prospectus liability in cases where the broker had knowledge of the false
or omitted statements.54
Like the BoersG provision, KAGG section 20 does not provide for abso-
lute liability, but limits its applicability to cases of lack of due diligence.55
It is, however, more protective than the Boersengesetz where the burden is
on the shareholder to prove the issuer's failure to provide adequate infor-
mation. By contrast, the KAGG assumes prima facie the issuer's or dealer's
responsibility by imposing upon them the burden of proof that no violation
occurred. Similar to the BoersG, the KAGG prospectus liability provision
imposes a time limitation. Action must be brought within six months after
the investor receives knowledge of the misstatement. In no case may dam-
ages be claimed more than three years from the date the investor acquired
the security. 56
C. Foreign Investment Companies
The fact that foreign mutual funds were not covered by the KAGG 57 and
were distributed without controls posed serious problems for investors,
58
given the growing internationalization of trade in the 1960s. To remedy
this situation, Germany adopted the Foreign Investment Company Act of
1969 (AIG).59
In comparing KAGG and AIG, it should first be noted that the two stat-
utes differ significantly in their applicability. The KAGG uses a definition
of "investment company" to effectuate its application; however, that dis-
tinction is not useful in determining the status of foreign organizations.
The AIG, on the other hand, governs investments which meet four basic
criteria.60  The AIG covers the distribution of shares for assets
which: (1) are subject to foreign jurisdiction, (2) consist of securities or real
"See KAGG § 20(l)(ii).
'"See KAGG § 20(4).
"See KAGG § 20(3) which excludes persons who might otherwise be held responsible from
liability, if they prove that: ". . they did not have knowledge of the misstatements or omis-
sions in the prospectus and that the failure to have knowledge was not due to gross
negligence."
'See KAGG § 20(5). This statutory limitation had been restricted to the relatively short
period of six months in order to prevent the investor from speculating on the prospective
development of his share while delaying action for prospectus liability.
"For discussion on that issue, see KOESTER, DER SCHUTZ DER KAPITALANLEGER IM DEUT-
SCHEN UND NORDAMERIKANISCHEN WERTPAPIER-UND INVESTMENTRECHT, 18 (1974).
"See Hopt, supra note 1; and id., at 18-23.
"Gesetz ueber den Vertrieb auslaendischer Investmentanteile und ueber die Bewertung der
Ertraege aus auslaendischen lnvestmentanteilen, vom 28. Juli 1969 (BGBI. I, p. 986).
°AlG § l(l)(i) provides: "The following provisions are applicable to the distribution by
public offer, public advertisement, or a similar means of shares for an asset consisting of secur-
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estate, (3) are invested pursuant to a schedule of risk diversification, 6 1 and
(4) are distributed by means of public advertisement. 62 Furthermore, for-
eign investment companies are required by the AIG to be registered with
the German Federal Board of Banking Operations [Bundesaufsichtsamt
fuer Kreditwesen].63
Although the AIG and the KAGG acts have similar structures, some dif-
ferences occur with respect to the organization of the investment com-
pany.64 To facilitate transactions for German investors, a foreign
investment company in Germany has to nominate a representative 65 and a
"pay office" 66 in addition to a deposit banking institute. 67 Under provisions
governing the actual investment contract, foreign investment companies
must comply with considerably more rigid standards than domestic ven-
tures. 68 Domestic companies, on the other hand, are required to define
their investment policies more precisely than are their foreign coun-
terparts. 69
As with domestic ventures, foreign companies may escape the applicabil-
ity of the AIG by forestalling compliance with a mandatory provision of the
act, such as dispensing with newspaper advertisements and limiting the
sales effort to the recommendation of banks. 70 However, such circumven-
tion would evoke unfavorable tax consequences, and the prohibition on use
of the word "investment" or similar designations in the name of the ven-
ture, as in the case of domestic companies.
For tax purposes, foreign investment companies are divided into three
different groups.7 1 First, companies qualifying under the AIG, as well as
companies whose shares are traded at a German National Securities
ities or real estate which is subject to foreign law and jurisdiction and invested in accordance
with principles of risk diversification (foreign investment shares)."
"AIG § l(l)(ii) extends compliance with this prerequisite to situations where major parts of




"Public" is understood only in a very narrow sense and limited to public advertisements in
newspapers or like sources. Offers conducted by banks to distribute the security among its
customers are, for instance, held as not being a public advertisement. See KOESTER, supra
note 57, at 51.
"See AIG § 7, enumerating the requirements for the registration statement.
'See AIG § 2. For a comparative view see Rutkowsky, Die unterschiedhche Rechtsstellung
deuischer und auslaendischer Investmentunternehmen, 1970 NJW 2193; for a broad survey, see
also KOESTER, supra note 57.
"See AIG § 2(1).
"See AIG § 2(3).
17A deposit bank is mandatory in both acts (see AIG § 2(2), KAGG § 12). The bank is
basically entrusted to safeguard the assets of the investment fund. For a comment on that
issue, see Mueller, Die Ueberwachung der Geschaeflsiaetigkeit der Kapitalanlagegeselschaft
durch die Depolbank, 1975 DB 485.
"See AIG § 2(4).
"Rutkowsky, supra note 64, at 2194.
"See supra note 62.
"For detailed comments, see Baur, supra note 50, at 561, 562.
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Exchange,72 are granted a preferred tax status.73 Second, companies which
report to the revenue service, but do not otherwise qualify under the AIG,
are not eligible for this preferential tax treatment. 74 Third, non-accredited
companies which do not report to the revenue service are subject to rather
stringent tax appraisal rules under the act.
7 5
Once their accredited status under the AIG has been ascertained, foreign
investment companies are obligated to furnish a prospectus upon sale of the
security.76 The types of disclosure required in prospectuses for domestic
and foreign companies are quite similar.77 A foreign investment company
is also subject to prospectus liability if any information contained in its
sales prospectus proves to be wrong or misleading. 78 Since the AIG
employs basically the same language to define the issuers' or its affiliates'
liability, the potential consequences for a domestic company hold equally
true for foreign issuers. 7
9
Ill. Recent Cases on Investors' Remedies
Within the last two decades, a phenomenon often termed the "gray capi-
tal market" 80 has been penetrating the investment business in Germany.8'
Starting in the 1960s and continuing since the early 1970s, investors have
become increasingly reluctant to support the traditional stock market.
82
Instead, so-called "public limited partnerships" [Publikumskommandit-
gesellschaften] have become an important investment vehicle primarily for
72AIG § 1(a) exempts issuers whose shares are traded at a National Security Exchange from
compliance with general provisions of the Act if - apart from the exchange notations and
related information - no further public advertisement is conducted. This exemption is of
particular importance to foreign companies that would otherwise be barred from the German
market. Thus, for instance, closed-end funds which are principally prohibited in Germany
(see AIG § 2(4)(b) and supra note 49) might be distributed pursuant to that exemption.
"See AIG § 17(3), which grants exemption from capital gains taxes. However, foreign issu-
ers may sometimes find it more advantageous to set up a domestic investment company, thus
avoiding some requirements to the AIG and, moreover, may be able to employ the favorable
tax rules available for investment companies in Germany which might not be available in their
domestic country. KOESTER, supra note 57, at 36; Rutkowsky, supra note 64, at 2197.
"See AIG § 18(l), (2).
7According to AIG § 18(3), all dividends plus ninety percent of the increase in value of the
investment share during the fiscal year are subject to income taxation. In no case may the
taxable income be below 10 percent of the shares' redemption or market value.
"6See AIG § 3.
"See Rutkowsky, supra note 64, at 2194 for a comment on differences in that respect.
"See AIG § 12.
"See also Rutkowsky, supra note 64, at 2195 for a comment on minor differences between
the two acts in that respect.
"°Hopt, supra note 1, at G22.
"Over DM 40 billion has been invested in the gray capital market to date; just in 1982, for
instance, an additional DM 4.5 billion was invested. See Spannagel, Neue Chancefuergrauen
Markt, 1983 DAS WERTPAPIER 476.
"
2For more detailed figures, see WIRTSCHAFTSBERICHTE DER DRESDNER BANK 4-6 (June
1982).
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wealthier individuals.8 3 In most instances these ventures are set up as lim-
ited partnerships where the sole general partner is a corporation, usually a
GmbH,84 and the investors are limited partners. Forms are also common
where the investor does not become a limited partner, but is merely the
beneficiary of a trust which holds the limited partner share.8 5
Originally, this type of investment venture had been created to take
advantage of the favorable tax treatment available to partnerships. 86 Pub-
lic limited partnerships are also known as tax shelter corporations
[Abschreibungsgesellschaften]. The scope of these businesses vary widely
and may include such diverse undertakings as natural oil and gas explora-
tion, motion picture production, or real estate development. 87
If a partnership structure is chosen, disclosure of material facts to pro-
spective investors is made solely at the promoters' discretion, 88 since the
provisions governing partnerships presuppose a close relationship between
the partners and do not call for elaborate disclosures or protective state-
ments. 89 Therefore, an investor's legal remedy is dependent solely on
underlying contractual provisions. By choosing the structure of a public
limited partnership, ventures with financial power equivalent to large cor-
porations are subject to provisions tailored for closely-held enterprises that
assume each partner's acquaintance with the business. Not surprisingly,
'
3 Hopt,supra note 1, at G23; Spannagel,.supra note 81, at 478 for approximate figures on the
investors' professional background.
'A Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung, GmbH [corporation with limited liability] is an
especially convenient legal entity for smaller enterprises because, except for certain large cor-
porations, no profit-loss accounts or balance sheets need be filed or published. A GmbH does
not issue share certificates; shares are transferred by notorarial or court protocol only [see
GmbH § 15]. For a survey on the GmbH see Ercklentz, The GmbH LawAmendments of1980,
15 INT'L LAW 645-54 (1981). For definition ofa GmbH for U.S. tax purposes see Rev. Rul. 77-
214, 1977-1, C.B. 408.
"
5 Since limited partners are to be registered in the Register of Commerce [see Han-
delsgesetzbuch § 162 (HGB)], some investors prefer this form to avoid the publicity connected
with a registration.
"Public limited partnerships frequently offer tax deductions which grossly exceed the
amount of the initial investment by employing losses for interest, managing fees or special tax
allowances, thus enabling the investor to benefit substantially from deferred tax payments.
Fierce competition among public limited partnerships seeking to offer the highest deductions
possible, however, has often caused these ventures to lend capital to the highest extent attaina-
ble to obtain maximum deductions for its limited partners. Not surprisingly, the resulting
undercapitalization caused additional problems for otherwise prudent enterprises. On this
topic see Hopt, supra note 1, at G35.
"
7Traditionally, real estate developments [Bauherrengemeinschaften] have been very popu-
lar. Following numerous problems, more "exotic" ventures such as exploration or movie
funds lost much of their market share; see Spannagel, supra note 81.
""Since a partnership can never be an accredited investment company under the Act, the
KAGG is not applicable per se; see supra note 37.
"See HGB § 105-177a.
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this unhealthy concept has brought about significant losses for uninformed
investors. 90
In response to the failure of the German legislature to react to this prob-
lem,9 1 the courts have taken measures to protect investors' rights. Since
false and misleading information provided by means of sales brochures has
been particularly troublesome, courts have focused on preliminary protec-
tion of potential investors by developing prospectus liability for public lim-
ited partnerships.
The initial thrust for this development was generated in cases where a
defective prospectus was distributed by individuals closely affiliated with
the general partner-corporation 92 of a public limited partnership. In the
first decision of the German Supreme Court on that issue,93 the defendants
were shareholders and officers of a GmbH which was the sole general part-
ner of a limited partnership. The venture had planned to acquire and man-
age a well-known restaurant enterprise, and within a short time had
managed to solicit DM 1.4 million from fifty-one limited partners. A sales
prospectus prepared by the defendants on behalf of the GmbH, stating that
the association had succeeded in acquiring the desired restaurant business,
proved to be inaccurate and the partnership had failed to obtain any rights
in the business mentioned in the prospectus. Shortly thereafter, it had to
seek protection under the Bankruptcy Act. All limited partners, including
the plaintiff, lost their investment. A tort action against the defendants,
based solely upon fraud charges, was ruled out by the particular circum-
stances of the case. Under German law only the principal can assume con-
tractual liability.94 Thus, ordinarily, an action could have been brought
successfully only against the initiator of the prospectus, the bankrupt gen-
eral partner-GmbH. 95 However, in this case the court ruled that piercing
the corporate veil was permissible. The opinion was based on the reasoning
that although no contract had existed between the parties, and the defend-
ants had acted solely as agents of the corporation while issuing the prospec-
tus, liability for breach of contractual duty could be extended to the agent
'See Coing, Haftung aus Prospekiwebungfuer Kapitalanlagen in der neueren Rechisprechung
des Bundesgerichishofes, 1980 WM 206.
"See infra text, part IV.
"See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
"'BGH in BGHZ 71, at p. 284 (4/24/78).
"See Buergerliches Gesetzbuch [German Civil Code] §§ 164-181 [hereinafter referred to as
BGB]. For exceptions from this concept, see BGB § 179.
"Action against the bankrupt partnership itself will not be successful in most cases, since
claims of third creditors of the partnership have priority over the limited partner investor as to
the date of the limited partner's cessation of membership. For critical comment on that issue,
see Moll, Anlegerschutz und Glaeubigerschutz - Zur Stellung des betrogenen Anlagekom-
manditisten, 1982 BB, BElL. 3.
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for plaintiffs reliance on his statements.96 The court further reasoned that
in a case where a GmbH is set up for the sole purpose of being a general
partner in a public limited partnership, it could be assumed that the average
investor would primarily trust the individual officers and shareholders of
such company instead of relying on the unknown corporate entity. Thus,
the shareholders and officers were held liable and relief was granted to the
plaintiff.
Shortly thereafter, a second decision was rendered by the German
Supreme Court.97 In this case, a shipping venture was to be operated by a
public limited partnership which was similar in structure to the limited
partnership in the first case. When the prospectus proved to be misleading,
an action was brought against the promoters and members of the Advisory
Board [Beirat] of the partnership. However, in contrast to the first case,
these defendants had not even been representatives of the GmbH issuing
the defective prospectus. Still, the court extended the range of prospectus
liability on the basis that the defendants had inspired the investor's confi-
dence in the truthfulness of the prospectus. In its opinion, the court stressed
that although the defendants had not legally represented the general part-
ner, GmbH, the mention of their names and occupations (merchant and tax
advisor) in the sales prospectus of the partnership could only be interpreted
to mean that the defendants had endorsed the reliability of the investment
in their professional capacity.
Finally, in a third decision,98 the court examined the extent of an individ-
ual's responsibility in connection with a corporation by extending liability
to a nonaffiliated agent9 9 who had arranged the investment for its customer,
the plaintiff. In that case, the agent recommended an investment and repre-
sented that he had studied the prospectus carefully. The prospectus stated
that the partnership had received firm commitments of reputable wholesale
and retail dealers to market the merchandise to be produced by the partner-
ship. This statement proved to be false and the partnership subsequently
filed for bankruptcy.
Again, liability was established on the basis that the agent had failed to
exercise due care in computing information concerning the public limited
partnership, and therefore, had betrayed the customer's reliance on the
agent's competency and trustworthiness. Most interesting in this case was
the court's decision on the amount of damage in controversy. While the
plaintiff demanded recovery for the total amount of his initial investment,
"Similar reasoning had been utilized previously by the Supreme Court in a different case;
see BGH in NJW 1976 at p. 1604.
"'See BGH in BGHZ 72, at p. 382 (11/16/78).
"See BGH in NJW 1979, at p. 1449 (3/22/79).




DM 200,000, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had saved a substantial
amount of income taxes, which amount could be deducted from the damage
claim. I°° The Supreme Court did not find merit in the defendant's argu-
ment. The court held that the plaintiff was equally subject to taxes for off-
setting accumulated losses. If any reduced taxation remained thereafter,
the court stated, it would be unfair to deprive the defrauded investor of this
advantage for the sole benefit of the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff was
granted full recovery.
The aforementioned decisions have been discussed extensively by numer-
ous German legal scholars. Although the result of these cases, prospectus
liability for public limited partnerships, has received unanimous acclaim, ' 0 1
the underlying reasoning rendered by the court has been subject to various
criticisms. Mainly, it has been argued that the court did not elaborate on
the situations in which prospectus liability could be expected, but rather
decided solely on a case-by-case basis. It has been argued that, in the fore-
going decisions, an actual contract between the parties was never intended.
Therefore, the court's theory for breach of contract or detrimental reliance
was seen as a contrivance to substantiate prospectus liability. It has been
suggested that the statutory provisions of the KAGG/AIG and the
BoersG10 2 should be applied analogously. 10 3
A later Supreme Court decision, known as the "Gran Canaria case,"'04
acknowledged the constructive scholastic criticism and consolidated the
application of prospectus liability. Though the court again based its opin-
ion on the breach of contract theory, it conceded that persons to be held
liable in public limited partnership cases were virtually identical with the
group of persons enumerated in Boers G section 45.10 5 Furthermore, the
court summarized:
""'The defendant argued that the plaintiff, being subject to 56 percent income tax, saved DM
112,000 in total. The same position had been held by the appellate court in that case: see BGH
supra note 97, at IV 1. The lower court's opinion clearly had been erroneous to the extent that
the plaintiff did not save a total of DM 112,000 in tax payments, but was subject to taxes for
capital gains after dissolution of the partnership; see BGH id., at IV 2. However, interest gains
for deferred tax payments, as well as the possibility of a lower tax rate resulting from the total
loss of the investment still accounted for substantial tax savings by the plaintiff.
""See Coing, supra note 90. Wiedemann and Schmitz, Anlegerschutz bei unrichtiger Infor-
mation, 1980 ZGR 130; Moll, supra note 94. Trost and Seymour, Iaftungfuer Werbeaussagen
beim Arbsatz von Kapitalanlagen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in den U. S.A., 1982
RIW 270; Schwark, Haftung aus dem Prospektfuer Kapitalanlagen, 1979 BB 897.
"'See supra part 11 A,B,C.
""See Coing, supra note 90, at 211; Wiedemann and Schmitz, supra note 100, at 131.
"'See BGH in 1981 NJW 1449. In that case, a public limited partnership intended to con-
struct and manage two hotels on the island of Gran Canaria. Spain. The prospectus stated that
DM 5,120,000 had to be paid for a parcel of undeveloped real estate, although it had been
clear at that time that the purchase price was DM 8,065,000. Again, the plaintiffs lost their
investment after the venture became insolvent.
"'For citation of BoersG § 45, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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The impact, as reasoned by the court, of a prospectus that solicits limited partners
for participation in a public limited partnership does not incur responsibility for
each person named therein in that each person would be held liable for all incor-
rectness or incompleteness of importance to the investor stated in the prospectus.
For persons who are not part of the group of initiating management, organizers
and promoters (BGHZ 71, 284 = NJW 1978, 1625) and who are not, as reasoned
in the opinion of November 16, 1978, exerting particular influence and co-respon-
sibility, liability for untrue and incomplete statements in the prospectus can be
imposed only within narrowly defined limits, for instance, if such persons estab-
lish a special standard of confidence in making statements (Senat, BGHZ 77, 172
= NJW 1980, 1840) or if and insofar as such persons incorporate-for instance as
investment agent-the prospectus by reference. 106
More recently, the Supreme Court applied the theory of analogous appli-
cation of statutory provisions to investment companies even more closely.
In a decision rendered in March 1982,107 the court focused for the first time
on the circumstances under which an action for prospectus liability became
void due to an inordinate lapse of time. Under German law, damages for
breach of general contractual duties [culpa in contrahendo] may be sought
within thirty years after the damage occurred. 10 8 Given the court's reason-
ing, by basing the action on a breach of contract theory, one would have
expected that the statutory limitation of thirty years would also hold valid
for the case at hand. However, the court here took a different approach and
found that a thirty-year limitation would be inappropriate in prospectus
liability cases. Instead of applying the general statutory limitation, an
analogous application of specific statutes governing prospectus liability in
related cases was deemed more suitable. The court subsequently discussed
the statutory limitations of the BoersG 10 9 and the KAGG/AIG," 0 and
arrived at the conclusion that the regulations set forth by the KAGG and
the AIG were more appropriately applicable in this case. Therefore,
actions brought later than six months after the investor received knowledge
of the misstatement in the prospectus or actions brought later than three
years after the investor acquired the share were estopped. The court denied
relief on the basis that the action had not been brought in a timely
fashion.'
""'See BGH supra note 103, at 1452.
"'See BGH in NJW 1982, at p. 1514. Underlying that decision was the "restaurant case,"
see supra note 92 and accompanying text; in this case, however, another investor had brought
action only after the initial case had been decided.
"'See BGB § 195.
""See supra part II(A); and BoersG § 47.
'"'See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
"'It should be noted, however, that the general statutory limitation of thirty years (see supra
note 106) is still applied in cases where action is brought not solely for prospectus liability but




The plethora of problems stemming from the unrestricted "gray capital
market" prompted the search for legislative action to promote a more
secure basis for investments in public limited partnerships. 112 Following an
official discussion at the 51st Annual German Lawyer's Convention in
1976,113 a bill governing the distribution of investment shares was intro-
duced by the German Parliament in 1978.l14 The act was proposed to
cover all types of investments that were publicly advertised or distributed" 15
and mandated the filing of a prospectus prior to the distribution of shares.
In addition, each investment venture was required to register with the Ger-
man Federal Board of Banking Operations and to file periodic reports. 16
The bill further provided for prospectus liability comparable to that
required by the provisions of the KAGG. 17 The proposal received broad
attention" t8 and was even incorporated as prospective legislature in an
opinion of the German Supreme Court. 1 9 Unfortunately, divergent
views 120 which developed subsequently could not be overcome and the bill
has not as yet been passed. Moreover, since the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have paved the way for legal action, it seems rather unlikely that the
proposal will be adopted in the near future. ' 2' Therefore, although it seems
evident that the "gray capital market" will ultimately have to be regulated
by statutory provisions, no prediction can be made as to when such legisla-
tion may be expected and what form it might eventually take. 22
V. Conclusions
There is, however, no apparent need for a regulatory system as detailed
as that in the United States for several reasons. 123 First, the volume and
"See Lutter, Zur Haftung des Emmissionsgehilfen im grauen Kapitalmarki, in FESTSCHRIFT
FIUER MARTIN BAERMANN ZUM SIEBZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAG 605 (1975); Wiedemann,
Kapitalanlegerschutz im deutschen Gesellschafisrecht, 1975 BB 1591; Schwark, supra note 30.
"'See the detailed opinion of Hopt rendered for that convention, supra note 1.
"'See Entwurf eines Gesetzes ueber den Vertrieb von Anteilen an Vermoegensanlagen,
BTDrucks, 8/1405 (1/2/1978).
"'See § I of the bill, id which enumerates the types of investments to be covered.
".See § 6, 8 of the bill, supra note 113.
"'See supra note 113, at § 7.
"Moll, supra note 100, at 6; see generally Ulmer and Dopfer. Anlegerschutz und
Gesel/schafisrecht 1978 BB 461. Hueffner, Die Publikumspersonengeselschaft und das Problem
des Anlegerschuizes 1979 JUS 457.
"BGH, supra note 106, at 1514.
"'See discussion in BTDrucks, supra note 113, at 20-27.
'According to an unofficial statement made by the German Federal Ministry of Finance to
the author in January 1983, no further action has been taken to pass the bill. Moreover, it was
expressed that due to the recent adjudication of the German Supreme Court, no urgent need
for the act existed.
"'See the detailed proposals of Hopt, supra note I.
"'Id. at G95.
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volatility of the German stock market, and correspondingly, the possibility
of deceit, is much more limited. German investors have indicated a strong
preference for bounds as their main investment vehicle,' 24 thereby display-
ing their trust in the more secure debenture market. The trade volume is
further diminished by a smaller group of institutional investors. Retire-
ment funds with large stock plans are relatively rare and of minor impor-
tance in the German investment market.125 Additionally, speculative types
of investment, which are especially susceptible to manipulation such as
short sales and various types of futures trading, are either restricted to pro-
fessional investors or barred altogether from the German market. 126 The
market for option trading is weak and stock options are available only for a
small number of very large corporations governed by statutory regula-
tion. 127
Perhaps most importantly, the corporate structure of the GmbH might
preclude the adoption of extensive legislative protection of investors com-
parable to that provided by U.S. regulations. Although it is a corporation,
and thus a distinct legal entity, a GmbH cannot issue stock certificates to
establish shareholders' equity in the company.' 28 Therefore, shares of a
GmbH may be transferred only pursuant to a comparatively cumbersome
and costly process.' 29 Accordingly, investments in a GmbH are usually
considered quite carefully and generally imply familiarity with the com-
pany on the part of the investor. Taking further into consideration that the
vast majority of corporations are organized as GmbHs, 130 this self-regula-
tory system might very well diminish any need for sophisticated securities
regulation in Germany.
2 See Wirtschaftsberichte, supra note 84.
.
2 Hopt, supra note 6, at 438.
'
26See BGB § 764; for a comment see Lueer, Boersentermingeschaeftsfaehigkeit und Diffe-
renzeinwand, 1979 JZ 171 ; and Kuempel, Zur Abgrenzung des Boersentermingeschaefts vom
Zeitgeschaeft am Beispiel der Effektenkomissionfuer Auslandsboersen, 1982 WM, BELL. 6; for a
brief survey in English see also Kraus, Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the Federal
Republic of Germany-Some Aspects of Public Policy, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 195, 200-03 (1982).2
'See VERORDNUNG UEBER DIE Zu BOERSENTERMINGESCHAEFTEN ZUGELASSENEN
WERTPAPIERE VOM 10. Maerz 1982 (BGBI. . 320), allowing option trading for the stocks of
forty-two domestic and thirteen foreign companies.
'2See supra note 84.
"'Id.; see Contra Meyer-Cording, Belebung des Kapitalmarktes durch neue Moeglichkeiten
der Zertifizierung, 1982 BB 896.
' 'As of Dec. 31, 1980, 255,940 GmbHs, as compared to only 2,141 AGs, were registered in
Germany. Eick supra note 28, at 282.
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